Core to the VRT's mission is challenging the general intrusion detection industry's view of "adequate" vulnerability coverage. One way we do this is to seek out new attack vectors for critical vulnerabilities the industry may have overlooked and take the initiative to write the proof of concept code and detection for aspects of a vulnerability that others might have missed. You no doubt have heard by now about the Heartbleed vulnerability and its implications for HTTPS servers that run the vulnerable versions of OpenSSL. Something not discussed enough is its implications for services running on protocols other than HTTP that also rely on OpenSSL. One such case is OpenVPN.
The OpenVPN protocol encapsulates the SSL/TLS session used for authentication, key exchange, and data tunneling in order to provide the reliable transport layer the SSL/TLS session needs, (since OpenVPN is often run over UDP). One improvement, and challenge to exploitation, that OpenVPN provides over vanilla TLS is that it supports optional HMAC signing of OpenVPN messages using a passphrase or key. This is a challenge to the attacker because not only do you need to properly encapsulate your malicious heartbeat message, you also (in cases where the server requires message signing) have to sign it with a valid HMAC. It is important to note that HMAC signing does not prevent the OpenVPN server from being vulnerable, as it is still possible to leak memory using HMAC signing if you have the passphrase or key. Unfortunately many OpenVPN servers have this feature disabled and are vulnerable to memory disclosure without authentication. If you are running an OpenVPN server, it is strongly recommended that you upgrade to the latest version of OpenSSL and enable HMAC signing of OpenVPN messages.
The VRT has developed working Heartbleed exploits for OpenVPN running over TCP and UDP. Detection for this vulnerability includes coverage for servers running over TCP and UDP with HMAC signing and without HMAC signing in SIDs 30711 through 30742.