Monday, March 30, 2015

Threat Spotlight: Dyre/Dyreza: An Analysis to Discover the DGA

This post was authored by Alex Chiu & Angel Villegas.

Overview


Banking and sensitive financial information is a highly coveted target for attackers because of the high value and obvious financial implications.  In the past year, a large amount of attention has been centered on Point of Sale (PoS) malware due to its major role in the compromise of several retailers.  While PoS malware is a major concern, attackers have also realized that targeting individual end users is an effective method of harvesting other types of financial data.  As a result, banking malware has become a prevalent category of malware that poses a major threat to users and organizations of all sizes.  One of the more well known examples of banking malware is Zeus.
Table of Contents

Overview
Technical Analysis
Domain Generation Algorithm
Other Thoughts
Conclusion
Appendix

Banking malware typically operates by redirecting users to malicious phishing sites where victim’s input their banking credentials thinking they are logging into their bank’s website.  Banking malware can also operate more stealthily by hooking into a browser’s functionality, capturing the victim’s credentials as they are typed in, and exfiltrating them.  Once an attacker has a victim’s banking credentials, attackers can then sell it or use it to perform illicit transactions (such as transferring funds to another account on behalf of the victim).

Tuesday, March 24, 2015

Threat Spotlight: The Imperiosus Curse --A Tool of the Dark Arts

Authors: William Largent, Jaeson Schultz, Craig Williams. Special thanks to Richard Harman for his contributions to this post.

As consumers, we are constantly bombarded by advertising, especially on the World Wide Web. There is a lot of money to be made either pushing Internet traffic, or displaying ads to consumers. Total annual Internet advertising revenue from 2013 was over US $117bn, and will approach US $200bn by the year 2018. The online advertising industry field is already awash with many players, each clamoring for a piece of the Internet advertising pie. In fact, so many ad impressions are bought and sold daily, that it’s nearly impossible to keep track of who is buying and selling what.

On one side of the online advertising spectrum are publishers. These are domains that receive Internet traffic and make money by displaying advertisements. On the other side of the spectrum we find advertisers who wish to sell products. And in the middle are ad-networks/ad-exchanges: marketplaces where publishers and advertisers can come together to wheel-and-deal on ad impressions. The astonishingly large number of online advertising industry middlemen between buyers and sellers creates terrific opportunities for bad actors to hide. The result is malware delivered through the online advertising ecosystem, A.K.A. “malvertising”.

How “bad guys” view the online ad industry.

How do malicious ads actually make it to end users? In our attempt to answer that question, Talos has uncovered a piece of Internet malvertising infrastructure that is both highly robust, and highly anonymized. It has been an Internet fixture for almost a sesquidecade, with redirection domains operating since early 2001. This infrastructure was designed specifically to focus Internet traffic towards advertising endpoints, unfortunately with little regard paid to legitimacy of the final destination.

Friday, March 20, 2015

Threat Spotlight: PoSeidon, A Deep Dive Into Point of Sale Malware

This post was authored by Andrea Allievi, Ben Baker, Nick Biasini, JJ Cummings, Douglas Goddard, William Largent, Angel Villegas, and Alain Zidouemba


Cisco’s Security Solutions (CSS) consists of information security experts with a unique blend of law enforcement, enterprise security and technology security backgrounds. The team works directly with Cisco’s Talos Security Intelligence & Research Group to identify known and unknown threats, quantify and prioritize risk, and minimize future risk.

When consumers make purchases from a retailer, the transaction is processed through Point-of-Sale (PoS) systems. When a credit or debit card is used, a PoS system is used to read the information stored on the magnetic stripe on the back of the credit card. Once this information gets stolen from a merchant, it can be encoded into a magnetic stripe and used with a new card. Criminal markets exist for this valuable information because the attackers are able to easily monetize stolen credit card data. Incidents involving PoS malware have been on the rise, affecting many large organizations as well as small mom-and-pop establishments and garnering a lot of media attention. The presence of large amounts of financial and personal information ensures that these companies and their retail PoS systems will remain attractive targets.

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Overview


There is a new malware family targeting PoS systems, infecting machines to scrape memory for credit card information and exfiltrate that data to servers, also primarily .ru TLD, for harvesting and likely resale. This new malware family, that we’ve nicknamed PoSeidon, has a few components to it, as illustrated by the diagram below:

PoSeidonimage10

At a high level, it starts with a Loader binary that upon being executed will first try to maintain persistence on the target machine in order to survive a possible system reboot. The Loader then contacts a command and control server, retrieving a URL which contains another binary to download and execute. The downloaded binary, FindStr, installs a keylogger and scans the memory of the PoS device for number sequences that could be credit card numbers. Upon verifying that the numbers are in fact credit card numbers, keystrokes and credit card numbers are encoded and sent to an exfiltration server.

Tuesday, March 17, 2015

Research Spotlight: Exploiting Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities

This blog post was authored by Earl Carter & Yves Younan.

Talos is constantly researching the ways in which threat actors take advantage of security weaknesses to exploit systems. Yves Younan of Talos will be presenting at CanSecWest on Friday March 20th. The topic of his talk will be FreeSentry, a software-based mitigation technique developed by Talos to protect against exploitation of use-after-free vulnerabilities. Use-after-free vulnerabilities have become an important class of security problems due to the existence of mitigations that protect against other types of vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows.

Thursday, March 12, 2015

Talos Discovery Spotlight: Hundreds of Thousands of Google AppsDomains’ Private WHOIS Information Disclosed

This post was authored by Nick Biasini, Alex Chiu, Jaeson Schultz, and Craig Williams. Special thanks to William McVey for his contributions to this post.

Overview


In mid-2013, a problem occurred that slowly began unmasking the hidden registration information for owners' domains that had opted into WHOIS privacy protection. These domains all appear to be registered via Google App [1], using eNom as a registrar. At the time of writing this blog, there are 305,925 domains registered via Google’s partnership with eNom. 282,867 domains, or roughly 94% appear have been affected [2]. (Google reports that new domains which have not faced a renewal period are not affected and many businesses do not opt into their privacy service.) The information disclosed included full names, addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses for each domain. The information was leaked in the form of WHOIS records.


The graphic above illustrates the drastic shift in domains utilizing privacy protection (dark green) to those with WHOIS information exposed (light green). At its peak at least 90% of the domains registered were utilizing privacy protection which plummeted to less than 1%. The grey circle indicates the initial shift occurring. The arrow notes when resolution had occurred.
The graphic above illustrates the drastic shift in domains utilizing privacy protection (dark green) to those with WHOIS information exposed (light green). At its peak at least 90% of the domains registered were utilizing privacy protection which plummeted to less than 1%. The grey circle indicates the initial shift occurring. The arrow notes when resolution had occurred.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015

Microsoft Patch Tuesday for March 2015: 14 Bulletins Released; FREAK Patched

Today, Microsoft has released their monthly set of security bulletins designed to address security vulnerabilities within their products.  This month’s release sees a total of 14 bulletins being released which address 45 CVEs.  The first 5 bulletins are rated critical and address vulnerabilities within Internet Explorer, Office, Windows, and VBScript. The remaining 9 bulletins are rated important and cover vulnerabilities within Windows Kernel Mode Drivers, Exchange, Task Scheduler, Remote Desktop, SChannel, and the Microsoft Graphics component.

Tuesday, March 3, 2015

Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking in the Domain Shadows

This post was authored by Nick Biasini and edited by Joel Esler.

Overview


Over the last several months Talos researchers have been monitoring a massive exploit kit campaign that is utilizing hijacked registrant accounts to create large amounts of subdomains for both initial redirection and exploitation. This campaign has been largely attributed to Angler Exploit Kit with fileless exploits serving various malicious payloads.

The use of hijacked accounts lead to a larger research project into the use of hijacked registrant accounts. During this research the earliest examples were found from a 2011 campaign with sporadic usage until December 2014. Since December 2014 more than 75% of the subdomain activity has occurred indicating a major shift in approach. This behavior has been covered before which discussed some of the older campaigns as well as the hosting indicators (ASN) of the groups making use of the subdomains.

Monday, March 2, 2015

Talos is Hiring

If you’re an experienced malware reverse engineer, exploit developer, response specialist, intel analyst, or looking to start your career in security, Talos might be the place for you.  We have a number of positions open in Columbia, Maryland; Austin, Texas; San Jose, California; and San Francisco, California.  If you are open to relocation to one of those areas, have the right skills, and share some of our beliefs below then applying for one of our numerous positions might be for you.

For those not familiar with Talos, it is Cisco’s premier Threat Intelligence organization that supports all of Cisco’s security portfolio.  Detecting and preventing threats that target Cisco customers is our job, and given Cisco’s security footprint and breadth of product portfolio we can engage those threats from Cloud to Core.

It does however, take a special type of individual to join Talos, so give the list below a look and see if your beliefs match up with our distinctive culture.